Unions United defends against the Chamber of Commerce War on Workers by uniting all Unions to act together in Solidarity. We are open to AFL-CIO Unions, Change to Win Unions, and Independent Unions across America.
More companies may be held responsible for labor-law violations committed by contractors and forced to negotiate wages and benefits with their workers under a decision by a politically split U.S. labor board.
The National Labor Relations Board, in a closely watched case, on Thursday unveiled a new standard for determining which companies are “joint employers” of workers paid by another business such as a franchisee or contractor.
Previously, employers were responsible only if they had direct control over working conditions. The standard, in use for three decades, is “increasingly out of step with changing economic circumstances, particularly the recent dramatic growth in contingent employment relationships,” the board ruled.
The case involved a Teamsters organizing drive of employees at a staffing facility who were working in a recycling facility owned by Browning-Ferris Industries Inc., a Houston-based waste management company. The case drew attention from labor, businesses and Republicans in Congress, who vow to try to block the panel’s decision.
The decision will be applied in separate cases pending against McDonald’s Corp. in which the labor board’s general counsel has accused the restaurant chain of labor violations at its franchisees.
Temporary Employment
The board cited a rise in temporary employment in its decision. Almost 2.9 million Americans had jobs through temporary agencies in 2014, or 2 percent of the workforce, up from 1.1 million in 1990, the board said.
The NLRB’s change means that companies that have the power to influence the conditions of workers through contracts or franchise agreements may be deemed joint employers. Business groups said now companies would become less efficient by tying them more directly to their contractors or other businesses that are now a step removed.
The International Franchise Association, a Washington-based business group, said the decision is a “seismic shift” in labor law.
“If allowed to go into effect, the impact of this new joint-employer rule would be sweeping and widespread, create havoc for the franchise industry and, ultimately, would inflict serious damage to our nation’s economy,” Steve Caldeira, the group’s chief executive, said in a statement.
‘Unprecedented’ Obligations
The decision was derided by the board’s two Republicans, who wrote a 29-page dissent -- eight pages longer than the opinion -- saying it will “subject countless entities to unprecedented new joint-bargaining obligations.”
The three Democrats said the Republicans’ dissent was “long and hyperbolic,” and misstates the standard “and grossly exaggerates its consequences.”
Chuck Cohen, an attorney at Morgan Lewis in Washington and former member of the board, said the standard is likely to be challenged in court.
“This doctrine is so far-reaching, I’m assuming it will end up in the Supreme Court,” Cohen said.
The NLRB decided to move away from criteria used for three decades in a case involving Browning-Ferris and the Teamsters union trying to draw the company to the negotiating table along with a staffing company, Phoenix-based Leadpoint Business Services.
The board found Browning-Ferris was a joint employer.
Wilma Liebman, a former head of the labor board who advocated for the new standard, said shifts in the workforce threatened to make basic protections provided by labor laws “illusory.”
Often the company with deeper pockets that hires a subcontractor sets conditions of employment through a contract, she said. These companies should be at the bargaining table, she said.
“The nature of employment and the nature of the economy has changed a lot,” Liebman said in an interview.
On Tuesday evening, we asked what would happen if emerging markets joined China in dumping US Treasurys. For months we’ve documented the PBoC’s liquidation of its vast stack of US paper. Back in July for instance, we noted that China had dumped a record $143 billion in US Treasurys in three months via Belgium, leaving Goldman speechless for once.
We followed all of this up this week by noting that thanks to the new FX regime (which, in theory anyway, should have required less intervention), China has likely sold somewhere on the order of $100 billion in US Treasurys in the past two weeks alone in open FX ops to steady the yuan. Put simply, as part of China's devaluation and subsequent attempts to contain said devaluation, China has been purging an epic amount of Treasurys.
But even as the cat was out of the bag for Zero Hedge readers and even as, to mix colorful escape metaphors, the genie has been out of the bottle since mid-August for China which, thanks to a steadfast refusal to just float the yuan and be done with it, will have to continue selling USTs by the hundreds of billions, the world at large was slow to wake up to what China’s FX interventions actually implied until Wednesday when two things happened: i) Bloomberg, citing fixed income desks in New York, noted "substantial selling pressure" in long-term USTs emanating from somebody in the "Far East", and ii) Bill Gross asked, in a tweet, if China was selling Treasuries.
Sure enough, on Thursday we got confirmation of what we’ve been detailing exhaustively for months. Here’s Bloomberg:
China has cut its holdings of U.S. Treasuries this month to raise dollars needed to support the yuan in the wake of a shock devaluation two weeks ago, according to people familiar with the matter.
Channels for such transactions include China selling directly, as well as through agents in Belgium and Switzerland, said one of the people, who declined to be identified as the information isn’t public. China has communicated with U.S. authorities about the sales,said another person. They didn’t reveal the size of the disposals.
The latest available Treasury data and estimates by strategists suggest that China controls $1.48 trillion of U.S. government debt, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That includes about $200 billion held through Belgium, which Nomura Holdings Inc. says is home to Chinese custodial accounts.
The PBOC has sold at least $106 billion of reserve assets in the last two weeks, including Treasuries, according to an estimate from Societe Generale SA. The figure was based on the bank’s calculation of how much liquidity will be added to China’s financial system through Tuesday’s reduction of interest rates and lenders’ reserve-requirement ratios. The assumption is that the central bank aims to replenish the funds it drained when it bought yuan to stabilize the currency.
Now that what has been glaringly obvious for at least six months has been given the official mainstream stamp of fact-based approval, the all-clear has been given for rampant speculation on what exactly this means for US monetary policy. Here’s Bloomberg again:
China selling Treasuries is “not a surprise, but possibly something which people haven’t fully priced in,” said Owen Callan, a Dublin-based fixed-income strategist at Cantor Fitzgerald LP.“It would change the outlook on Treasuries quite a bit if you started to price in a fairly large liquidation of their reserves over the next six months or so as they manage the yuan to whatever level they have in mind.”
“By selling Treasuries to defend the renminbi, they’re preventing Treasury yields from going lower despite the fact that we’ve seen a sharp drop in the stock market,” David Woo, head of global rates and currencies research at Bank of America Corp., said on Bloomberg Television on Wednesday. “China has a direct impact on global markets through U.S. rates.”
As we discussed on Wednesday evening, we do, thanks to a review of the extant academic literature undertaken by Citi, have an idea of what foreign FX reserve liquidation means for USTs. "Suppose EM and developing countries, which hold $5491 bn in reserves, reduce holdings by 10% over one year - this amounts to 3.07% of US GDP and means 10yr Treasury yields rates rise by a mammoth 108bp ,"Citi said, in a note dated earlier this week.
In other words, for every $500 billion in liquidated Chinese FX reserves, there's an attendant 108bps worth of upward pressure on the 10Y. Bear in mind here that thanks to the threat of a looming Fed rate hike and a litany of other factors including plunging commodity prices and idiosyncratic political risks, EM currencies are in free fall which means that it's not just China that's in the process of liquidating USD assets.
The clear takeaway is that there's a substantial amount of upward pressure building for UST yields and that is a decisively undesirable situation for the Fed to find itself in going into September. On Wednesday we summed the situation up as follows: "one of the catalysts for the EM outflows is the looming Fed hike which, when taken together with the above, means that if the FOMC raises rates, they will almost surely accelerate the pressure on EM, triggering further FX reserve drawdowns (i.e. UST dumping), resulting in substantial upward pressure on yields and prompting an immediate policy reversal and perhaps even QE4."
Well now that China's UST liquidation frenzy has reached a pace where it could no longer be swept under the rug and/or played down as inconsequential, and now that Bill Dudley has officially opened the door for "additional quantitative easing", it would appear that the only way to prevent China and EM UST liquidation from, as Citi puts it, "choking off the US housing market," and exerting a kind of forced tightening via the UST transmission channel, will be for the FOMC to usher in QE4.
AS THEY WISH: Banks got much of what they wanted when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission cut some key disclosure requirements from new rules on asset-backed securities. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
Part 1: Intense lobbying of regulators, many of them veterans of the industry themselves, helped ensure that practices the Dodd-Frank law was meant to stop would remain in place.
NEW YORK – In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Keith Higgins was certain: Banks weren’t to blame.
Higgins, a top attorney at prominent law firm Ropes & Gray LLP, was chairman of an American Bar Association committee on securities regulation. As such, he lobbied strenuously against a rule U.S. regulators were drafting that would require banks to disclose a lot more about asset-backed securities like those that had just torpedoed the economy.
In letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Higgins argued that divulging more details about the mortgages and other financial products that go into such securities would only confuse investors. And it was investors, with “insufficient understanding and … commitment” to their investments, who had been the real cause of the crisis, he argued in a July 2008 letter.
Then, in May 2013, as the SEC was still hashing out the rule, Higgins was tapped to lead the very 500-person SEC division that was writing it.
When the final version of Reg AB II came out last year, disclosure rules advocated by many within the agency had been stripped out. Of particular concern: Banks could continue to sell asset-backed securities to institutional investors on the private market with no new disclosure requirements.
Reg AB II was one of many rules Congress ordered up in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act to fill regulatory holes in the market for asset-backed securities. An unprecedented expansion of this multitrillion-dollar market, in which banks repackage mortgages and other assets into complex securities and sell them to investors, lay at the heart of the financial crisis.
But as the evolution of Reg AB II suggests, banks and their advocates have managed to preserve many of the industry’s pre-crisis practices by focusing lobbying efforts on obscure corners of the regulatory world, far from the glare of congressional debate or public scrutiny. Many of these agencies are staffed by appointees from the industry they regulate and return to it when their stints are over.
“The banks have done an end run around all the disclosure efforts,” said Thomas Adams, a securitization lawyer at Paykin Krieg & Adams LLP.
Four of the six lawyers now in the leadership of the American Bar Association committee that Higgins chaired have worked for the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. And between 1993 and 2006, the proportion of financial services veterans on the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) went from zero to 25 percent, according to a 2012 Harvard Business School study.
BIG LEAP: Keith Higgins was chair of an American Bar Association committee that had been lobbying the SEC to ease proposed dislcosure requirements in asset-backed securities when he was named to head the SEC division drafting those rules. REUTERS/Joshua Roberts
Higgins declined to comment.
SEC Chief of Staff Lona Nallengara said the selection of Higgins to run the division was a reflection of his status as “a respected securities practitioner with 30 years’ experience.”
Nallengara, who was acting director of the Division of Corporation Finance for seven months before Higgins took over, said the decision to remove disclosure requirements for private offerings from Reg AB II was made before Higgins arrived. “Keith had no influence on that decision,” he said.
Like the SEC when it was weighing rules on asset-backed securities, FASB, the private group that sets accounting standards for public companies, came under political pressure to tighten rules blamed for exacerbating the financial crisis. Critics said FASB had made it too easy for banks to stash mountains of securitized loans in off-balance-sheet vehicles based in the Cayman Islands, hiding their exposure to risks that eventually swamped them and the global economy.
Here, too, banks pushed back hard. And here, too, their protests reached sympathetic ears. Ultimately, FASB’s rules barely dented the size of banks’ off-book holdings.
The practical effect of these lobbying efforts has been obvious.
Thanks to the private-market loophole in the SEC’s Reg AB II, banks are selling a greater share of securitized debt than ever on private markets – largely off the radar of regulators and watchdogs.
Residential mortgage-backed securities tendered on the private market jumped to 78 percent of all new offerings last year from 46 percent in 2013 and just 10 percent in 2007, according to data obtained by Thomson Reuters. The privately sold share for commercial mortgage-backed securities jumped to 83 percent from 37 percent in 2013.
The markets for asset-backed securities today are a fraction of what they were in the run-up to the crisis. But they are showing strong signs of revival. What bothers some current and former regulators and industry watchers is that much of the regulatory framework that enabled the crisis remains in place.
“What’s playing out is exactly what we were worried about,” said Sheila Bair, former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. “Most everything is going into these private markets where regulations require little visibility of what’s happening.”
With their access to off-balance-sheet entities largely preserved, the banks continue to hold vast sums of securitized loans offshore and off their books. Together, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Corp, Citigroup, Wells Fargo & Co, Goldman Sachs Group Inc and Morgan Stanley hold nearly $3.3 trillion of securitized loans in off-balance-sheet entities.
“I still think there is significantly more risk there than is being reflected on banks’ balance sheets,” Bair said.
It isn’t just the banks. As hedge funds and private equity funds have ramped up high-risk lending in recent years, their use of off-balance-sheet vehicles has ballooned. For example, KKR & Co LP’s reported exposure to loss from off-balance-sheet entities has risen tenfold since 2010. A KKR spokesperson said less than half of the firm’s off-balance-sheet entities are composed of corporate loans originated by KKR and securitized into collateralized loan obligations, but declined to provide numbers or other information.
Robert W. Stewart, a spokesman for the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), which oversees FASB, said the new rules “resulted in a dramatic increase” of the holdings financial firms and companies in other industries keep on their books. “These standards eliminated long-standing exceptions for securitizations, and that reduced the opportunity for work-arounds,” he said.
HOLDING THE BAG
Even before the crisis, FASB struggled for years with how banks should account for off-balance-sheet entities and the assets held in them.
Every additional dollar in assets on a bank’s balance sheet requires holding more idle cash in capital reserves to cover those assets if they drop in value. The increase in reserves means less revenue and earning power and smaller employee bonuses.
Off-balance-sheet vehicles free banks to make more loans and build assets without having to add to capital reserves. These assets include all sorts of things: Treasury securities, home and commercial real estate mortgages, auto loans, even “junk” loans used to finance leveraged buyouts. Banks bundle the assets into securities, sell the securities to investors, and then park the assets in separately incorporated off-balance-sheet vehicles.
In theory, if one of these vehicles fails because the underlying assets sour – as, for example, when large numbers of homeowners default on their mortgages – the bank does not have to bail it out.
In practice, they often do – to preserve their reputations in a lucrative market, and because specific asset-backed securities often carry implicit or explicit guarantees that leave banks legally liable to make investors whole.
“Repeatedly, constantly, when the new off-balance-sheet entity got into financial difficulty, the bank bailed out the entity that they supposedly didn’t have any more connection with,” said Halsey Bullen, who was with FASB from 1983 to 2006, much of that time managing financial instruments projects.
STANDARDS-BEARER: Robert Herz resigned as chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board after years of advocating for tougher accounting rules for banks. REUTERS/Mike Theiler
“There was unending lobbying of the FASB” to let banks continue stashing loans off their balance sheets.
FASB sought to address the issue several times before the crisis – to no avail. It tightened rules on Special Purpose Entities, the off-balance-sheet vehicles that played a big role in the collapse of Enron Corp in 2001. But banks simply started using alternatives called Qualifying Special Purpose Entities (QSPEs).
Again, in 2005, as banks were stuffing huge amounts of securitized subprime mortgages into QSPEs, FASB Chairman Robert Herz began to push for change. Earlier in his career, Herz turned down a shot to be U.S. chief executive officer of accounting giant PriceWaterhouse Coopers, where he was a partner, rather than give up his campaign to remake accounting standards. Now, he wanted to toughen the rules and require banks to put more loans back on their balance sheets.
“Clearly there were lots of things that had been given off-balance-sheet treatment that should not have been designated as such,” said Herz. “All the big Wall Street firms were doing it.”
Herz was opposed, former FASB officials said, by former JP Morgan Vice President Leslie Seidman – a FASB member known to some of her critics as “Loophole Leslie” for her advocacy of bank-friendly accounting rules.
Herz’s effort fizzled out. “I started to realize that some people on the board didn’t want to get anywhere,” said Don Young, a FASB board member at the time.
Seidman said she objected to the initial proposals because they would have made the rules more complex and created more exceptions.
Then, in 2008, the U.S. housing bubble burst, and with it, the market for mortgage-backed securities.
Citigroup announced that it was on the hook for more than $100 billion in loans it had placed in off-balance-sheet vehicles. All told, the biggest U.S. banks wound up bringing back onto their books more than $300 billion of guarantees for off-balance-sheet loans and bonds, according to a report by RiskMetrics Group Inc. The banks paid out billions more in lawsuits to investors demanding that they take responsibility for off-balance-sheet loans.
Under pressure from Congress, FASB again took up the issue. Banks bombarded the board with comment letters and tasked full-time staff to sway it as it started drafting new rules.
Force banks to report too much lending on their balance sheets, Citigroup, Bank of America and other banks argued, and credit available to ordinary Americans would shrink. Make them disclose too much information about what was going off-balance-sheet, and it would just confuse investors.
In September 2008, Young, the FASB member, told a congressional hearing: “There was unending lobbying of the FASB” to preserve banks’ right to continue stashing loans off their balance sheets.
Even so, FASB’s draft rules did away with QSPEs. That left something known as a Variable Interest Entity, which carried a tougher standard banks had to meet to secure off-balance-sheet treatment. But then, as the lobbying continued, FASB relaxed the rules for VIEs, essentially closing one loophole while opening another.
“The changes were all in the direction of watering it down,” said Marcus Stanley, director of Americans for Financial Reform, a consumer group in Washington, D.C.
There are concrete measures of the banks’ lobbying success. When FASB published the first draft of the rules in 2008, Citigroup warned in its annual report that it expected to increase its risk-weighted assets by $100 billion as a result of having to bring loans onto its books.
A year later, after FASB issued its final draft of the new rules, Citigroup brought just $24 billion in risk-weighted assets back onto its books. At the time, it had $557.5 billion in off-balance-sheet loans.
The new rules took effect on Jan. 1, 2010. The top six U.S. banks brought about $400 billion of loans back onto their books, a 2010 Deloitte Study found, a fraction of the $4 trillion of loans – mostly mortgages – those banks then held off their balance sheets.
That August, Herz walked out of a FASB meeting and resigned. He said at the time that he wanted to spend more time with his family. Several people close to him said FAF, the overseer of FASB, forced out Herz amid growing backlash against his tough stances on some accounting rules important to banks.
Stewart, the FAF spokesman, declined to comment on the circumstances surrounding Herz’s departure.
The six-person committee overseeing the selection process for Herz’s successor included a former chief investment officer of Swiss bank UBS AG; the managing partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co, one of the largest private banks in the U.S.; a former American Express vice president; and a lawyer from Brown & Associates, a law firm that caters to financial industry clients.
They chose Seidman, the first former bank executive – rather than auditor – to hold the top spot.
Bank stocks rose on the news.
Seidman’s term at FASB ended in 2013. She is now a director at ratings company Moody’s Corp and on the board of governors of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Wall Street’s self-regulatory group.
PRIVATE MATTERS
A few months after FASB published the final version of its new accounting rules, the SEC released a draft of Reg AB II.
The rule represented regulators’ effort to address a big factor in the financial crisis: lack of information about the mortgages, leveraged loans and other securitized assets that banks had been stuffing into off-balance-sheet entities.
Banks argued that additional disclosures would saddle them with an unnecessary and costly burden that would cripple the securitization industry and dry up credit for millions of Americans.
Among other things, Dodd-Frank ordered the SEC to “adopt regulations … requiring each issuer of an asset-backed security to disclose, for each tranche or class of security, information regarding the assets backing that security.”
An early draft of the rule would have required, for example, that a seller of mortgage-backed securities provide “loan tape” to regulators and investors. That’s an industry term for a breakdown of all the mortgages in a security, including each borrower’s credit history, the loan-to-value ratio of each mortgage, and other measures of risk.
The first draft of the rule applied the stricter requirements to securities sold on both the public and the private markets. SEC rules have long distinguished between investments meant for ordinary mom-and-pop investors and those for wealthy, sophisticated institutional investors.
The mass-market investments are registered with the SEC and require extensive disclosure before they can be offered to the public. The private investments typically aren’t registered with the SEC, carry scant disclosure requirements and are sold to “accredited investors” considered savvy enough to know what they are buying.
That distinction fell apart during the financial crisis, when it became clear that supposedly sophisticated investors were holding vast stores of toxic mortgage-backed securities. “The disaster was way worse in unregistered private markets during the crisis,” said a senior industry regulator. “Not addressing that market did not seem to be addressing the crisis.”
SEC staff overwhelmingly supported the rule, according to people inside the agency. So, too, did two important SEC constituencies: investors, who believed the rule would make it easier to assess the quality of the securities, and ratings agencies, whose failure to accurately rate such securities landed them in hot water in 2008.
The banks, however, opposed the early draft. In dozens of comment letters to the SEC, they argued that the additional disclosures would saddle them with an unnecessary and costly burden that would cripple the securitization industry and in turn dry up credit for millions of Americans.
Banks were helped by a particularly vocal and effective advocate: the American Bar Association. The ABA’s Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities – that’s the committee with four former SEC employees – wrote 94 comment letters to the SEC and other regulators after the crisis, making it one of the most prolific commenters on SEC rules. Nearly all of the comments parroted letters from banks and financial industry lobbyists.
Higgins, chair of the committee when the SEC started drafting Reg AB II, personally signed 46 of the letters. He also was one of Ropes & Gray’s top securities lawyers, advising clients such as Hasbro Inc and Reebok International Ltd.
Time and again, he argued that investors had only themselves to blame for their losses in the financial crisis. “These problems have been compounded in the structured finance markets not by insufficient information, but by insufficient understanding of the information that is already available to investors,” he wrote in one letter. “Rather than needing more information, these investors need both the commitment and the tools to analyze and distill the information that is already available.”
The ABA’s lobbying carried particular weight with the SEC because of the banks’ growing reliance on the courts to fight reforms they opposed. In the year that followed 2010 passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC churned out an average of 5.5 new rule proposals a month, one of the fastest rule-making clips in SEC history. Rules governing swaps, whistleblowers, and reporting of executive compensation were among dozens of proposals the agency issued.
TOP WATCHDOG: SEC Chair Mary Jo White said the agency’s new disclosure rules on the asset-backed securities at the heart of the financial crisis ensure that investors “have full information.” REUTERS/Jose Luis Magana
Then, on July 22, 2011, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., struck down an unrelated SEC rule mandated by Dodd-Frank that would have made it easier for shareholders to replace company directors. The court said SEC staff hadn’t done a sufficient cost-benefit analysis of the new rule.
The ruling, which was sharply critical of the SEC’s rule-making process, “intimidated the agency,” said Barbara Roper, director of investor protection for the Consumer Federation of America and a member of the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee.
SEC rule-making ground to a halt. Since the court decision, the SEC has published less than one new draft rule a month.
In May 2013, one month after Mary Jo White was sworn in as SEC chairwoman, she tapped Higgins to be director of the agency’s Division of Corporation Finance, in charge of writing the rule he had lobbied against. Some inside the SEC were shocked.
Higgins was close to White’s husband, John White, a partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP who had himself chaired the SEC division when Higgins was head of the ABA committee, according to people who know both men.
John White and Mary Jo White declined to comment.
On August 27 last year, 52 months after the original draft proposal of Reg AB II was floated, the SEC adopted the final version. The 683-page rule detailed a raft of new disclosure requirements for asset-backed securities – but only for those registered with the SEC for general offer to the public. For the same securities sold on the private market, disclosure requirements remained scant.
SEC Chair White said the new rules would ensure that investors “have full information, the tools and the time to understand potential investments and the nature and extent of associated risks.”
In the end, 2014 saw a bigger share than ever of asset-backed securities being sold on private markets, with little disclosure or regulatory oversight.
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Responding to growing public pressure and local government initiatives, T-Mobile US announced this week that it would be adopt a paid parental leave program. The company also said it would end an oppressive policy that required call center workers to be on the phone 96.5% of their work time, leaving them with virtually no time for follow up on customer issues or to make changes in customers’ accounts as needed.(*)
This is great news for workers who often must struggle to balance family and career. It comes as workers at T-Mobile US and a coalition of community supporters in cities like Albuquerque, N.M., step up efforts to restore a fair workweek and achieve other improvements for workers.(*)
Members of TU, the union of T-Mobile workers, the Communications Workers of America and many organizations, including the Center for Popular Democracy, OLÉ and other coalition partners, have been raising concerns about unfair scheduling and other issues for workers at T-Mobile US and other employers. Workers want a voice in the decisions that affect them in their workplace -- not just the ones that the company selectively picks and chooses. That’s why T-Mobile US workers are joining TU.(*)
T-Mobile US’s initial scheduling changes were made just as the Albuquerque City Council was moving forward to consider a proposal to implement paid sick leave and scheduling improvements. The Albuquerque coalition hosted a town hall meeting on irregular scheduling, where Albuquerque City Council members pledged to support their fight for a fair workweek including the right to take sick leave without retaliation.(*)
A recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision found T-Mobile guilty of engaging in illegal employment policies that prevented workers from even talking to each other about problems on the job. The judge ordered the company to rescind those policies and inform all 46,000 employees about the verdict.(*)
Parental leave is a good first step toward helping workers balance their career and family responsibilities. But workers want real bargaining rights and the right to fairly choose union representation. That’s what T-Mobile must realize.(*)
On February 20, the ILWU reached a tentative agreement for a new 5-year contract with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA). And on April 3, ILWU Coast Longshore Caucus delegates voted by a margin of 78% to recommend approval of the tentative agreement. The proposed 5-year contract covers 20,000 dockworkers at 29 west coast ports.
Workers gather in solidarity near the Vincent Thomas Bridge, before marching along the San Pedro waterfront on January 22, 2014. (Photo by Stephen Carr / Daily Breeze)
ILWU International President Bob McEllrath claimed victory, saying “we secured a tentative agreement to maintain good jobs for dockworkers, families and communities from San Diego to Bellingham.” Indeed it is likely that the ILWU may have won most of its demands, including maintaining health benefits for workers, families and pensioners, continued ILWU jurisdiction for inspecting chassis units at the ports, and improving the arbitration system to make it fairer.
Those last two issues were the most contentious. Chassis are the wheeled, flat beds used by trucks to transport cargo after it leaves the ship. The PMA used to supply chassis, and ILWU had the right to inspect them. But in recent years the terminal operators sold their chassis to equipment-leasing companies who are not members of the PMA, and had no contractual relationship with the ILWU. These companies frequently hired non-union or non-ILWU labor to maintain and repair the chassis. The demand for jurisdiction also escalated the conflict between the ILWU and the Machinists who also maintain chassis at some terminals on the West Coast. The overall issue had serious repercussions, as hundreds of ILWU members are mechanics, whose jobs would have been threatened if the ILWU had lost jurisdiction over chassis maintenance and repair.
Arbitrators, who mediate on-site disputes between the unions and the PMA, were also an issue. The previous agreement was that both parties must agree to dismiss the arbitrators, which common sense dictates is hardly likely to happen.
ILWU Holds Strong Against Attempted Intimidation and Lies
This was clearly the longest struggle between the PMA and the ILWU in over ten years. The PMA and ILWU, representing thousands of workers at 29 West Coast ports have been negotiating an expired labor contract since May 15. The six-year contract ended on July 1.
The PMA, or Pacific Maritime Association is a global corporate entity, its 72 member companies compose of container shipping cartels, bulk cargo carriers, terminal operators and stevedores. Its largest members include Denmark-based Maersk Line, Korean-based Hanjin Shipping, Japan-based NYK Line, Hong Kong-based OOCL, China-based COSCO, and terminal operators like SSA and others.
The shipping magnates went all out with a variety of tactics to break the union’s ability to negotiate its conditions and work flow.
The PMA waged war in the corporate media, portraying the ILWU workers as over-paid, claiming full time longshoremen made an average of $147,000 per year. (The true figure is much more likely to be in the $80’s, and that’s if you are working full-time, which many ILWU members are not.) As ILWU President Robert McEllrath stated, “What the ILWU heard…is a man who makes about $1 million a year telling the working class that we have more than our share.”
By mid-January, the PMA had eliminated night and evening shifts, slashing container and cargo loading and unloading operations by 60%.
The PMA created slowdowns on the docks, while blaming ILWU workers for them. Terminal operators claimed they couldn’t accept empty cargo containers to load because of overcrowded docks. Last month, they had cut crane crews and eliminated night shifts, claiming too much congestion on the dockside yards. This was shown to be a lie, as the ILWU took aerial photos showing plenty of room on the docks.
The PMA also imposed periodic lockouts, intending to build support for their position, and put more pressure on the ILWU. In Seattle, Seattle City Councilperson and Social Alternative member Kshama Sawant, joined by two other members of the City Council, condemned the move. “These temporary lockouts are a destructive negotiating tactic that has caused shipments to be delayed in Seattle and other port cities. To increase the profits of a few multinational corporations, you have cost the US economy up to $2 billion a day and made longshore workers lose wages.”
Finally, with the dispute at West Coast ports continuing, President Obama dispatched U.S. Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez to push for a settlement. Obama’s dispatching of Perez drew positive reaction from business groups with the National Retail Federation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups saluting the White House engagement. (Had there been a full port lockout, the White House could have sought a Taft-Hartley Act injunction forcing a 80-day resumption of work while bargaining continues — and if the ILWU engaged in slowdowns during the cooling-off period, the administration could have ruled the ILWU in contempt of court.)
The Underlying Issue of Port Reorganization
Former ILWU International President and current LA Harbor Commissioner David Arian speaks to longshoremen at the ILWU dispatch hall in Wilmington, CA on Friday, January 2, 2015. (Photo: Scott Varley, Daily Breeze)
The ILWU maintains that there are major changes in the industry that make their job more difficult. And they are right.
Larger ships: As a way of insuring profits since the recession upended the shipping industry, containers are being shipped on larger ships. Unloading these becomes much more logistically challenging, there are ships coming in that are carrying 14,000 TEUs [20-foot containers]. Some recent orders for new ships have been even larger, with capacities of at least 18,000 TEUs. Visualize a ship as long as the Empire State Building is tall and 10 freeway lanes wide. In the past, the average vessel carried 6 – 8,500 TEUs. The impact of these large ships is exacerbated by shipping alliances that pack a larger variety of goods on the same ship. The organization of these products takes more time than in the past when most goods coming off a ship came from the same place.
Peak time congestion: Once off the ship, cargo still has to go to distributions centers, some of them a significant distance from the docks. At the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex, importers and exporters pay a premium to pick up and drop off cargo containers during the day. Still, carriers concentrate inbound and outbound traffic during certain times of the day, adding to freeway congestion. Clogged roads affect the Port of Seattle as well, as it located near an urban area with a narrow transportation grid, where it takes longer to get goods in and out of the port over highways that are already carrying the maximum amount of single passenger vehicle traffic.
Coal/Oil trains: Coal and oil shipments by rail have become top priority of the BNSF railroad. Ports and retailers suffer as those items receive priority, pushing everything else down the line and slowing transfer of containers and bulk agricultural goods.
Automation: As terminals become overwhelmed by concentrated growth in volumes, stevedoring companies are trying to implement more mechanization and computerization to load and unload bigger vessels, shuttle boxes to and from the storage yard, stack containers, lift them on and off truck chassis, and process trucks through the gates. Two terminals in Southern California – OOCL’s Middle Harbor facility at the Port of Long Beach and the TraPac Terminal at the Port of Los Angeles – are being upgraded to include automated rail gantry cranes and other technology that will make them among the most modern port facilities in North America. These terminals deploy the latest technologies, such as remote-controlled, rail-mounted gantry cranes to stack and store containers, and remotely guided carts to ferry containers into the yard. This prompted a dispute with ILWU Local 13, who staged a series of job actions until a settlement was reached to include ILWU members in the control room functions and guarantee data sharing with the union.
During the last contract that expired at the end of June, the International Longshore and Warehouse Union agreed to allow technology at marine facilities as long as the parameters of each deployment were negotiated on a case by case basis. But not all ILWU members win this fight. Several years ago, almost 100 jobs were eliminated when APM Terminals introduced similar technology in Norfolk, Virginia. This reflects a need by the Longshoremen not to allow the terms of automation dictated to them.
